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Abstract 
Technological developments in emerging AI technologies are assumed to further 
routinize and improve the efficiency of decision making tasks, even in professional 
contexts such as medical diagnosis, human resource management, and criminal justice. 
We have little research on how AI technologies are actually used and adopted in practice. 
Prior research on technology in organizations documents a gap between the expectations 
for new technology and its actual use in practice. We conducted a comparative field study 
of three sections in a Department of Radiology in a major US hospital, whereby new and 
existing AI tools were being used and experimented with. In contrast to expectations 
about AI tools, our study reveals how such tools can lead routine professional decision 
making tasks to become nonroutine, as they increased ambiguity and decision makers 
had to work to reduce it. This is particularly challenging since the costs of dealing with 
ambiguity – increased time to diagnose – were often weighed against the benefits of such 
ambiguity (potentially more accurate diagnoses). This study contributes to literatures 
related to technology, work, and organizations, as well as the role of ambiguity in 
professionals’ knowledge work. 
Keywords:  Artificial intelligence, professionalism, new technology and work, innovation 
Introduction 
Technological developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI) promise continuous improvement in decision-
making, problem-solving, and reasoning capabilities that edge closer and closer to human capabilities 
(Davenport and Kirby 2016). Augmenting and automating these tasks with AI may fundamentally shift the 
nature and prevalence of knowledge work in future organizations and reimagine how knowledge is 
produced and evaluated by new configurations of humans and machines (Erickson et al. 2018; Faraj et al. 
2018). In this context, AI generally refers to a wide range of algorithms and computer-aided systems that 
detect patterns among data sets of past behaviors and link these patterns to potential future outcomes (von 
Krogh 2018). AI adoption falls within the larger phenomenon of digital transformation, which has become 
a central theme in how we theorize myriad dimensions of work and organizational life (Bailey et al. 2012; 
Kellogg et al. 2006; Orlikowski 2010; Valentine et al. 2017; Zammuto et al. 2007).  
While AI is within the realm of digital transformations, its particular characteristics have elicited an intense 
response from practitioners and scholars alike. Yet amidst this exploding discourse, we lack a deep 
understanding of how AI impacts individuals, groups, and organizational outcomes in practice. Scholars of 
technology in organizations are urged to study this “new and poorly understood phenomenon” (von Krogh 
2018, p. 408), and, specifically, the ways in which AI augments diverse dimensions of organizational life. 
Even organizational creativity scholars (Amabile 2019) are called upon to examine new configurations of 
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human-machine intelligence and their effects on the production of new and creative ideas. This study 
follows recent calls for phenomenon-based examination of AI in organizational life and investigates four 
implementations of AI in a radiology department. 
The field of diagnostic radiology is expected to undergo dramatic transformation in the age of AI. Leading 
experts in artificial technology, such as Professor Geoffrey Hinton, stated that people should stop training 
radiologists as AI made technological leaps in image processing capabilities. Radiology is at the cutting-
edge of adopting emerging technologies, including AI, which makes this setting particularly relevant for 
learning about the unfolding nature of AI use in professional knowledge work for high judgment decisions. 
This paper is based on a field study of three sections within a department of radiology using different AI 
tools at a major tertiary hospital in the United States. This study reveals how, even for routine tasks, AI 
induces increased diagnostic ambiguity and doubt as radiologists struggle to produce accurate and time-
sensitive medical diagnoses using such tools. This is critical as radiologists must weigh the costs and 
benefits of using AI in their decision making process. This study contributes to the nascent understanding 
of the adoption and use of emerging intelligent technologies in professional knowledge work and to our 
understanding of ambiguity in such work.  
Theoretical Perspectives 
Artificial Intelligence in Organizations 
The term “artificial intelligence” and its associated capabilities have transformed over the past decades. 
Over four decades ago, Herbert Simon argued that “every manager needs to be able to analyze problems 
systematically (and with the aid of the modern arsenal of analytical tools provided by management science 
and AI)” (1987, p. 63). This iteration of “artificial intelligence” refers to early computers that performed 
computationally heavy tasks like census tabulation or weather pattern analysis. Today, the term “artificial 
intelligence” is associated with the ability of technology to make predictions about the future (Chen et al. 
2012). Advances in AI stem from the exponential availability of data capturing diverse dimensions of 
organizational and private life as well as technological developments in computer science and engineering 
to support efficient and low-cost data processing (Chen et al. 2012; von Krogh 2018; Lycett 2013).  
Following these continuous technological advances, organizational scholars are beginning to take notice of 
the impacts of AI on organizational life. Speculating about the diverse ways AI may transform organizations, 
Faraj and colleagues (2018) call for studies where AI is implemented to accomplish work previously 
involving human input and reasoning. Today, radiology work is highly subject to human interpretation and 
reasoning. Automating such work raises questions about the ability of AI to mimic or surpass the quality of 
decisions made by humans. Von Krogh (2018) offers useful direction for this area of research. He suggests 
that studies of AI should consider task inputs, task process, and task output to understand the purpose and 
functioning of AI in relation to humans in organizational settings. This study follows his call to examine the 
meanings and uses of AI with respect to specific features of the decision-making tasks. 
Organizational scholars have begun looking at algorithms and the resulting the reconfiguration of practices 
in contexts such as sales (Pachidi et al. 2019), travel and hospitality evaluation (Orlikowski and Scott 2014), 
ride-sharing (Cameron Working Paper; Rosenblat 2018), and the introduction of robots into pharmacies 
(Barrett et al. 2012) and hospital settings (Beane 2018; Beane and Orlikowski 2015). For instance, Christin 
(2017) compared and contrasted the use of predictive algorithms in two occupational domains where 
elements of work could be automated or supplemented by data mining capabilities and computational 
power, first for assessing criminal profiles in criminal justice and second in predicting article readership in 
online journalism. This literature demonstrates professionals’ the variety of responses to the introduction 
of new technology in their workplace.  
These studies demonstrate how it is not enough to show was algorithms are, but how they are used in 
practice: “A practice only exists as it is materialized in specific times, places, texts, artifacts, bodies, 
infrastructure, and so on” (Beane and Orlikowski 2015, p. 1553). Doing so involves accounting for the range 
of technological features in addition to social and organizational features (Zammuto, Griffith, Majchrzak, 
Dougherty, & Faraj, 2007). As transformative technological change unfolds, symbolic dimensions of 
working with AI tools are especially important, as individuals make sense of AI over time (Prasad 1993; 
Weick 1990). Reflecting the evocative nature of AI that holds multiple meanings for different individuals, 
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reflecting their fears, desires, concerns, and needs. This study of AI in radiology seeks to explain what AI 
and its technological features represents to radiologists, and how those representations shape and are 
shaped the diagnostic decision-making process.  
High Stakes Knowledge Work and Artificial Intelligence 
While organizational research on automating or augmenting work with AI is currently in its early days, 
specific research in economics seeks to characterize and measure the anticipated impact of technological 
advances like AI on future labor markets at the level of tasks, jobs, and overall labor markets. Using tasks 
characteristics, Dhar (2016) argues that tasks with a higher degree of predictability and a low cost of making 
an erroneous judgement are more likely to be subject to AI automation than less predictable tasks with 
higher costs. Furthermore, Frey and Osborne (2017) conclude that just under half of jobs in the United 
States are highly susceptible to automation based on the degree of perception and manual manipulation, 
creative intelligence, and social intelligence required to a job’s core tasks. It is essential to extend scholarly 
discussion beyond predictions and averages to understand what is happening on the ground in work 
contexts where AI has already begun to augment or automate tasks. This study addresses this need, 
examining diagnosis work in radiology, a high-stakes task that requires synthesis and expertise.  
At its core, making diagnostic decisions is a form of knowledge work, which has grown as a focus of 
organizational research in recent decades (Barley and Kunda 2001; Bechky 2006; Boland and Tenkasi 
1995). Knowledge is conceptualized as an ongoing process embedded in individuals’ everyday work 
practices (Nicolini 2012; Orlikowski 2002) that emerges from its social and organizational context (Lave 
and Wenger 1991; Suchman 1987). Researchers have been studying how knowledge work is impacted and 
reconfigured with the introduction of new technology, which is among the set of social and organizational 
factors that facilitate and shape knowledge work (Knorr-Cetina 1999; Latour 1987; Orlikowski 2002; 
Zammuto et al. 2007). For instance, scholars analyze how the rise of digitalization provides tools and 
methods, facilitating communication, and expanding work roles and relations (Boland et al. 2007).  
However, it is unclear what effects AI will have on processes of knowledge production and evaluation. 
Individuals within a given field share practices about what type of knowledge is valid and how to engage 
with information, which are increasingly being challenges or reinterpreted in light of new advanced 
technology.  It is critical for studies to closely investigate contexts in which these tools are already in use. 
Doing so will allow deeper understanding of how AI is embedded within and shaping such processes, going 
beyond characterizations of such tools as either useful or not.  As new technologies are adopted and used, 
there is potential for such tools to fundamentally challenge or disrupt epistemic cultures and professionals’ 
existing ways of knowing (Kaplan 2011). For instance, Dougherty and Dunne (2011) show how the use of 
digital tools and methods led to the creation of new kinds of knowledge in drug discovery. In the context of 
financial trading, Knorr Cetina (2016) traces the disruption of knowledge assumptions as trading evolved 
towards relying on algorithmic models rather than human experts. Pachidi and colleagues (2019) trace the 
struggles and ultimately elimination of a sales team asked to use a predictive tool that challenges their long-
standing practices of knowledge production and evaluation. It is unclear what will be the role of humans in 
knowledge processes where technology is seemingly capable of “generating” novel insights on its own as 
technology detects patterns and relationships in datasets (Christin 2017; Faraj et al. 2018).  
Methods 
Research setting 
This research is based on an in-depth qualitative field study of a Radiology Department at Urbanside 
Hospital1, a tertiary medical center in a major United States city. Diagnostic radiology is a medical specialty 
in which medical imaging technology is used to help diagnose and treat a wide range of diseases. If a 
physician suspects a diagnosis for a current patient, they may refer the patient to have medical imaging, 
which was analyzed by diagnostic radiologists. Depending on the patient scenario, radiologists may be 
involved in defining imaging parameters or participating in the image acquisition process. The radiologist 
opens the patient’s complete study, black and white images, patient history information and reporting 
software fill four large monitors. At Urbanside, diagnostic radiologists spent anywhere between a few 
                                                        
1 All names are pseudonyms. 
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minutes to an hour analyzing one case, depending on a number of factors including imaging modality (e.g., 
X-ray, CT scan, MRI, ultrasound, mammogram), the number and complexity of suspected ailments, the 
patient’s medical history, number of prior images available, and so forth. After analyzing the case (described 
in detail in the first section of the findings), the radiologist described their overall impressions and 
diagnostic conclusions in a detailed report that is sent back to the referring clinician. 
Data collection 
Starting in fall of 2018, I immersed myself in the field of radiology, attending professional conferences, 
symposia, trainings, and vendor presentations, to understand the challenges and opportunities on the 
field’s horizon from the radiologist perspective. Ethnographic field work began in January of 2019 and 
spanned three sections of radiology at Urbanside that were actively using AI tools in their section: Chest 
radiology, Breast imaging, and Pediatrics radiology. A total of 34 radiologists were observed in this study, 
including 22 attendings, 4 fellows, and 8 residents. 
Observation 
I spent between three and four days a week observing radiologists’ day-to-day work (Van Maanen 1988). 
This involved documenting detailed observations of the radiologists’ diagnostic decision making process in 
real time in a notebook, which were supplemented upon leaving the hospital each day. Because Urbanside 
radiologists trained medical students, residents, and fellows, it was possible to capture radiologists’ detailed 
explanations of their decision making process and diagnostic reasoning. In total, I observed over five 
hundred diagnostic decisions. I paid particularly close attention to the way radiologists used technological 
artifacts and how they spoke of these artifacts in practice. Approximately one third of the observed diagnosis 
decisions involved using AI tools. During these instance, it was specifically documented how the tool was 
used, to what extent radiologists’ considered the AI output, and any verbal or nonverbal reactions made by 
the radiologist and among radiologists. 
Interviews 
Data was also collected through a total of 27 semi-structured interviews (Spradley 1979). Fourteen informal 
interviews took place as radiologists conducted their work or during short breaks between tasks, covering 
topics such as why they selected their particular sub-specialty or what types of cases they prefer. Thirteen 
formal interviews allowed me to deepen our understanding of the interviewees’ perspective of what it means 
to be a radiologist, their diagnostic decision making process, and the role of various technologies in their 
work. All formal interviews and some informal interviews are recorded (with informants’ permission and 
consent) and transcribed.  
Documentation and artifact 
Finally, I collected documentation and artifact data. First, I captured technical artifacts of the AI tools: 
pieces of code, accuracy outputs of the AI models, training data sets, FDA submissions, published technical 
research, and detailed documentation materials. I also captured artifacts produced and used by the 
radiologists: medical notes taken, photographs and drawings of images on their monitors, technology 
training materials, and departmental communications. These artifacts were used to deepen my 
understanding of radiologists’ work and the diagnostic decision making process.  
Data analysis 
In keeping with the principles of grounded theory development, I engaged in regular analysis during and 
throughout the observational period (Charmaz 2014; Glaser and Strauss 1967). In the early stages, I 
conducted open coding to capture a broad range of emerging themes, including “seeking colleague’s input”, 
“searching for more information”, “showing frustration over the image quality”, “expressing the need to 
move quickly,” and so forth. Following grounded theory methods, I constantly compared the emerging 
themes and categories across ongoing data collection. Within the first few months, the extreme time 
pressure of the radiologists’ work and their frequent expressions of doubt and question asking while making 
diagnoses were striking. I was also surprised to observe such variation in how AI tools were used across the 
range of cases.  
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Following these emerging themes, I conducted additional targeted data collection and analysis focusing on 
the diagnostic decision making processes for the specific categories of diseases where AI tools were 
implemented: routine breast cancer screening (Breast section), routine lung nodule search (Chest section), 
and bone age assessment (Pediatrics). Through this phase, additional themes emerged related to how 
radiologists interacted (or not) with the tool, including “questioning AI validity,” “disagreeing with the tool 
assessment,” “confirming original diagnosis,” and “expressing doubt”. I observed multiple patterns of how 
and when individuals evoked AI tools and to what extent these assessments were incorporated into user’ 
final determinations.  
To understand this variation, I analyzed additional data related to their implementation and use. I studied 
the differences in the technical features and their respective historical patterns of use. Analysis was 
conducted to understand how these differences were related to how variation in how the radiologists 
perceived and used the tools in practice. I also conducted additional rounds of comparative analysis that 
led to deeper understanding of how radiologists with different levels of expertise approached the task and 
use of certain AI tools differently.  
Once I established a grounded understanding of the diagnostic processes involving AI, I turned to the 
theoretical literature of advanced technology in knowledge production and evaluation processes. I iterated 
between analyzing empirical observations and relating them to prior literature to further enhance the 
formal theory development (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Through this stage, I found the role of ambiguity to 
be particularly important, and thus I continued to analyze the data taking these concepts and theoretical 
relationships into account, which is described in the next section.   
Findings 
1.0 Making high stakes diagnostic decisions at Urbanside 
Making accurate and complete diagnoses2 involved high stakes decision making that had the potential to 
dramatically impact patients’ lives as well as radiologists’ professional reputations. Urbanside radiologists 
were cognizant that their decisions had immense consequences for their patients. They remarked on the 
stakes for patients as they read cases, such as when Hattie (Breast) reflected on patients’ heightened level 
of anxiety as they waited for their cancer screening results: “Half of them are out of their mind when they 
come in here. They’re all in this anxiety, and it’s just a whole thing. They’re all nervous. They all come here 
and think they have cancer.” The impact of their diagnostic determination weighed considerably on 
Urbanside radiologists while they performed their work. One afternoon, Leslie (Chest) reported a severe 
diagnosis and released a deep exhale as she picked up the phone to relay the results to the patient’s referring 
physician: “It’s going to ruin her day. It’s going to ruin everything for her.” 
Making accurate and complete diagnostic decisions was also consequential for radiologists’ professionally. 
Urbanside radiologists’ awareness of one another’s strengths and weaknesses factored into their daily 
interactions, especially regarding who was and was not consulted for help. This was exemplified by Lola 
(Breast), who explained why her confidence in her diagnosis increased after consulting a colleague with a 
reputation for making excellent calls: “I was looking for someone whose opinion I would trust on a tricky 
case. Different people have different strengths. Her (the doctor she consulted) recall rate is 6% (far better 
than the department average)! There’s a few people who have both time and practice, and a really good eye. 
They’re people who we would like to read more like.” Radiologists made references to what they perceived 
to be their strengths and their desires to develop their weaknesses. It was especially common for junior 
radiologists to discuss their goals and efforts towards improving their decisiveness. In the following 
exchange, Raj, a resident in the Breast section, hesitated while making a diagnostic decision, explaining 
how he was “super edgy on these cases,” or struggling to select among diagnosis alternatives. Shaw, who 
                                                        
2 When we refer to the “diagnostic decision”, we refer to the set of findings and impressions radiologists 
provided to referring clinicians in their radiology report. The report may include one or more possible 
diagnosis “differentials” and may explicitly rule others out. Upon received the report, clinician then take 
further steps towards confirming the diagnosis, which is typically beyond the scope of radiologists’ work 
and this study. 
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just began his one-year fellowship3 in the Breast section, was reading alongside him: “Me too. But I’ve really 
got to change. That’s what this year is for.”   
Diagnostic errors were associated with major professional consequences for radiologists’ reputation, 
heightening the stakes of each decision they made. Radiologists bore sole responsibility for their evaluations 
of patients’ cases, and their signed reports are permanently archived in patients’ medical records. Most past 
reports resulted in little to no fall-out, but on occasion, diagnosis errors came to light that called the 
radiologist’s ability and reputation into question. In some instances, radiologists discovered one another’s 
errors by finding disease in a patient’s current study and noticing earlier signs of the disease were detectable 
in prior imaging – earlier signs that a previous radiologist failed to detect. The traceable nature of the 
archived radiology reports and the implications for their reputations contributed to radiologists’ heightened 
level of concentration: “Since we have 20 years’ worth of mammograms, you can always go back and say, 
‘Oh, they missed it.’ So we have to be really careful,” (Irene, Breast).  Urbanside radiologists had formal and 
informal practices for notifying the responsible radiologist of the errors they detected. One morning in the 
Chest reading room, a fellow found signs of a severe condition in a patient’s current imaging. When she 
realized a senior attending had not commented on visible signs of the disease in a study earlier that year, 
she consulted another attending about how to address the situation, “Do you think we should tell the person 
who read the original chest radiograph?...I would want to know if I missed it.” The attending replied, “We 
always want to know…When this happens, we do let one another know. I’ll email him. Otherwise how will 
we ever get better?” 
Diagnosis errors could lead to medical malpractice lawsuits that jeopardized radiologists’ reputation as well 
as their financial and job security. The possibility of being sued was not absent from radiologists’ daily 
activities. This was the case for Leroy (Chest), who specifically included a carefully worded phrase in each 
radiology report he signed. He explained how he began using this sentence after a challenging lawsuit he 
was involved in years ago: “I got sued a long time ago for a study I read correctly. The patient died from 
something related to the heart, and the lawyer kept saying, ‘Why didn’t you talk about her cardiomyopathy 
on her report?’ And I kept saying, ‘This is not the right test for that diagnosis.’…So I don’t know. This (the 
sentence he always inserted) might not protect me from a lawsuit, but it makes me feel better.”  
Struggling to make accurate and complete diagnostic decisions 
There were two distinct dimensions that led to diagnostic errors: the possibility of misinterpreting the study 
and the possibility of missing important details. Urbanside radiologists, like Nadia (Pediatrics) frequently 
voiced concerns that stemmed from one or both of these possibilities: “You don’t want to get a case wrong. 
You don’t want to make the wrong diagnosis, obviously, or miss something.” 
Radiologists were concerned that the way they interpreted a study could lead to diagnostic errors. The 
primary source of diagnostic evidence for radiologists was patients’ medical imaging. Accurately 
interpreting the subtleties of medical imaging required expertise, which radiologists’ developed through 
extensive training and apprenticeship: “Radiology residency is 5 years for a very good reason. It’s just, the 
image looks like different shades of grey! That’s what I thought when I was first a medical 
student…Someone once called it ‘retinol mileage’. You just have to see a lot,” (Irene, Breast).  
Yet even with ample “retinol mileage”, the ambiguity introduced by medical imaging created regular 
opportunities for misinterpretation and error. High degrees of professional judgement and subjectivity 
were involved in translating visual signals into a variety of different possible diagnoses. Complex anatomy 
and diseases varied widely within patient populations and elevated the possibility for misinterpretation: 
“For breast imaging, everyone’s breast looks different. Like, a liver is a liver, a gull bladder is a gull bladder. 
Depending on your age, menopausal status, your weight, additional risk factors, there is huge variation. It 
really requires a lot of concentration for us to look for cancer,” (Irene, Breast). Radiologists frequently 
expressed their continued deliberation and second-guessing of cases they completed earlier in the day: “I 
don’t know, I really hope we’re right about that,” (Rita, Pediatrics). 
                                                        
3 Radiology training typically involves completing medical school, five years of radiology residency, at least 
one year of fellowship, and all required professional examinations prior to becoming an attending 
radiologist.  
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Urbanside radiologists were on edge when faced with the possibility that they made a diagnostic error on a 
past patient. One afternoon, the head of the Pediatrics section called the central phone in the Pediatrics 
reading room. Lori answered the call, listened, and then confirmed the spelling of the patient’s name out 
loud while looking up the record. Across the room, Shira sat up straight in her chair, recognizing the name 
of a patient she read a few hours before. She listened to Lori’s end of the conversation on full alert and 
probed her for more information: “Did I do something wrong? (No response from Lori) Why are we looking 
at this case? Did I screw up? (No response) Why is she asking us to look it up? (No response) This makes 
me very stressed.”  
Given the professional judgement and subjectivity involved, diagnostic errors were ultimately made and 
caused radiologists angst and strife. During a particularly challenging moment, a radiology Chest fellow 
broke down in the reading room, “There are so many things going on but not everything fits. I feel like I’ve 
been doing everything wrong lately....I’m just muddling my way through things case after case. Sometimes 
you take cases and feel right on. Other days you are just drowning,” (Sylvie). In response, Leslie (Chest) 
offered encouragement to the distressed fellow, explaining how errors are difficult to avoid when making 
interpretations: “All of us have been presented with a bad outcome. We all have misses. Interpretation is 
hard. It’s not necessarily like you weren’t looking or paying attention. It’s like, you interpreted it, right? And 
we can be right or wrong when we interpret things,” (Leslie, Chest). Many radiologists echoed the reasoning 
that making mistakes is inherent when making subjective diagnostic decisions: “There’s always going to be 
stuff you don’t know. There’s always things that come up that I've never seen before…Everyone has misses. 
That's part of the job is just being able to accept that,” (Emily, Breast). 
Regarding the second dimension, Urbanside radiologists were also acutely aware of the possibility of 
missing consequential details. Consuming and integrating every relevant detail in the imaging and patient 
history required unyielding attentiveness. In addition to a patient’s vast medical history, each study 
comprised multiple high resolution images or sequences of images (50-70 consecutive slices). Each 
available image also included multiple alternative views and numerous options and features for highlighting 
or subduing various anatomical aspects: “There is so much volume of data on the films to deal with,” (June, 
Chest).  
Even with a focused and methodical approach, relevant details were sometimes obscured by the 
complicated nature of human anatomy and disease. In the case of detecting breast cancer on mammogram 
images, radiologists rigorously searched the patient’s white-appearing tissue for miniscule dots that were 
also white-appearing: “It’s like looking for a snowball in a snowstorm,” (Caroline, Breast). In the case of 
searching for lung nodules in a lung CT study, Leslie (Chest) struggled while trying to visualize an area of 
tissue nestled behind a rib: “Am I hallucinating a nodule? It’s behind two ribs, so it’s impossible to get a 
good look. Ah I think it’s a vessel. Yeah I don’t think it’s a nodule. Windowing really helps. Ah yeah, I’m 
pretty sure.” By “windowing”, or lowering the brightness of bone, she could better visualize the hidden area 
and concluded it was an innocuous blood vessel instead of a nodule (which would have suggested cancer).  
The possibility of missing details was exacerbated by certain limitations of imaging techniques. Radiologists 
commonly ordered additional medical imaging if they suspected the additional views could help them 
visualize the anatomy more completely. In the following instance, Lola (Breast) wanted classify a suspicious 
area deep in the patient’s breast as benign, but hesitated due to her inability to see that tissue perfectly 
(areas deep in the breast are difficult to capture using mammogram): “It’s (the suspicious tissue) probably 
down here (just outside the image border). It’s probably related to her surgical scar. It’s probably in this 
patch of tissue somewhere. If I could see clearly in this area, I wouldn’t be so concerned.” Despite the many 
logical reasons Lola listed in support of making a benign classification, she ordered additional images to be 
certain she was considering every possible consequential detail. 
Practicing doubt during diagnostic decision making 
Urbanside radiologists commonly exercised doubt practices to help them cope with the subjectivity and 
complexity involved in diagnostic decision making. Exercising doubt involved seeking out evidence that 
would contradict or support tentative diagnosis theories. Doubt practices involved radiologists asking 
themselves questions, seeking colleagues’ opinions, and acquiring additional imaging or patient 
information. These practices helped radiologists prevent premature conclusions, thoughtfully weigh 
conflicting information, and thoroughly consider every available detail. In this instance, June (Chest) 
questioned her tentative diagnosis that a specific nodule was stable (benign) and searched for additional 
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evidence to either prove or disprove her theory: “Is that it? I guess so. I think it’s there. I want to be more 
convinced.” She scrutinized images in prior studies until finally confirming that the nodule was benign, as 
it had a stable size and shape over several years. In the following case, Leroy (Chest) gestured to a thick 
haziness in the patient’s lungs as he sat back in his chair and posed questions to himself that helped him 
consider a range of diagnosis alternatives. “I’m trying to picture: what’s going on here? Could it just be mild 
edema? Yes, it could be. But could it also be something else? Like, if you did a CT would you see little nodules 
and airspace? I think it could be, yes. So I think it could be bronchopneumonia. And I’m going to put 
possible drug-reaction too because that can give you this kind of appearance.” 
Soliciting one another’s input was another way radiologists exercised doubt. Once a radiologist made a 
tentative assessment, they oftentimes asked a colleague to weigh in, either over the phone, via IM, or in 
person. This was particularly common when assessing potentially life-threatening diagnoses, as Shira 
(Pediatrics) described, “We do a double and triple check when we read malignancies. Nobody wants to miss 
a tumor. Nobody wants to miss a reoccurrence of cancer.” In the following instance, Kyle (Breast) asked his 
colleague Lola (Breast) to weigh in on a mass that was catching his eye, and Lola conveyed her opinion that 
the mass was benign. Kyle asked how she reached that conclusion, and Lola directed him to “look at (the 
image from) 2012. Zoom in. Really zoom in. It’s (the mass) circumscribed, and it’s uniform. Do you agree 
with me?” Kyle hesitated due to how prominent the mass looked in the current 2019 image. Lola offered 
additional explanation into her reasoning, “I didn’t make the mass go away, but I established stability. It’s 
got a uniform shape (in the 2019 image) and in 2012 it’s got a uniform shape.” Nodding, Kyle scrolled 
through the full set of images again and agreed that the mass was benign. A formalized version of this 
practice is referred to as double-reading, whereby two radiologists independently interpreted a case and 
converged their assessments into a single report. Yet, due to the time-consuming and resource-intensive 
nature of double-reading, it was not widely instituted at Urbanside.  
Temporal demands on diagnostic decision making 
At Urbanside, time was incredibly precious, as radiologists were under immense pressure to achieve rapid 
turnaround times for high volumes of cases. In a particularly revealing interaction, the head of the Breast 
section explained her tendency of referring to the Breast imaging section as “the gulag”: “Welcome to the 
gulag! That’s what I call it, the gulag.…Where they work you to death and they throw maybe a cup of water 
at you, maybe a slice of bread every other day. That’s what the gulag is. It’s a horrible, horrible place.”  It 
was not uncommon to observe Urbanside radiologists working continuously at their workstation for hours 
without leaving their desk or checking their phone or email. The authors of a recent commentary 
published in prominent academic Radiology journal also emphasized the intense and demanding culture 
of modern radiology environments4: “Time is a scarce resource in the modern fast-paced, high-pressure 
clinical [environment]. Radiologist fatigue has been a long-standing concern but is being exacerbated by 
expanding practices, growing examination volume, and increasing complexity of imaging data that need 
to be interpreted.” 
Time pressure further exacerbated Urbanside radiologists’ likelihood to make incomplete or misinterpreted 
interpretations that could result in diagnostic errors. As they strained to keep up with the incoming flow of 
studies throughout the day, their ability to provide diligent evaluations diminished: “At the end of the day, 
there’s like a mad rush to try to get through all the cases. And you’re most tired at the end of the day. You’re 
trying to plow through, trying to increase your speed and get through the material,” (Gianna, Chest). As 
Gianna suggested, radiologists recognized the potential consequences of moving too rapidly through their 
work: “To me, you know, there’s too much human error. People are already going so fast,” (Nadia, 
Pediatrics).  
Thus, Urbanside radiologists faced a deep tension between the temporal demands of their organizational 
context and their dedication to making accurate and complete diagnostic decisions. Sitting at her 
workstation at one morning, Irene (Breast) was concerned by the queue of cases which was already 
overwhelming and continued to grow: “We have to give our full attention to make the right call, but we have 
so much volume we’re supposed to get through. It’s a conflicting thing,” (Irene, Breast). Consequently, 
                                                        
4 Hsu, W. & Hoyt, A. 2019. Using Time as a Measure of Impact for AI Systems: Implications in Breast 
Screening. Radiology: Artificial Intelligence, 1 (4): 1. 
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Urbanside radiologists were focused by reading efficiently and avoiding wasted time and effort. Every 
doubt-related practice Urbanside radiologists enacted incurred a potential costs, in terms of time, within 
the high-pressure environment: “If I was really looking, like taking my time, teaching medical students, I 
think I would have seen it. But I think if I was just trying to get through as many studies as possible, I'm not 
so sur,” (Sylvie, Chest). 
Making accurate and complete diagnostic decisions was both extremely high stakes and extremely prone to 
error. They worked diligently by exercising doubt practices to avoid making harmful errors. Intense 
temporal demands not only intensified the likelihood of making such errors, but also amplified the costs 
for exercising doubt. Building upon this understanding, the following section presents how the use of AI 
tools related to Urbanside radiologists’ diagnostic practices and struggles. 
2.0 Coping with AI-induced-ambiguity during diagnostic decision making 
Urbanside radiologists widely shared expectations that AI tools were capable of enhancing their daily work. 
In particular, they pointed to AI as a means to improve the speed at which they could perform time-
consuming routine tasks: “It’s kind of menial labor at this point, just to be using calipers to measure whether 
a nodule is bigger or smaller. It’s something that should be automated in the future, and that will make a 
huge difference in the speed we can get through cases,” (Brady, Chest). They often described the alternative 
tasks they could spend their time performing if AI would alleviate the tedious aspects of their work. In the 
following case, Shira (Pediatrics) expressed that if AI could do tedious measuring tasks for scoliosis 
patients, she could focus her expertise on higher-risk anatomy (such as the lungs and abdomen): “We want 
it (AI) for scoliosis....It’s incredibly tedious. It’s not interesting work…If something (AI) could do that for 
me, then I could look at the lungs and look at the abdomen myself. That’s where my eyes are going to be the 
most important.” 
Using AI for the bone age assessment task 
Radiologists in the Urbanside Pediatrics section expressed especially high expectations that AI could help 
them perform “bone age assessments”.  Assessing bone age5 involved determining how a patient’s skeletal 
maturity related to their chronological age by comparing a patient’s hand x-ray to an atlas of standard 
images of children’s hand at each consecutive year of life. To make these assessments, a volumous text book 
was situated in the radiologist’s lap, and she looked back and forth comparing different age standards to 
the appearance of the current patient’s x-ray on their monitor. Excitement grew around the idea of 
implementing a bone age AI tool, as Nathan underlined: “I think AI can be very useful…You have to look 
very finely and carefully at a bunch of different images, it’s visually overwhelming, but I think it’s something 
a computer is really good at...It’s just pattern recognition.” So Urbanside Pediatrics radiologists 
implemented an AI tool (developed by an external research institution) that automatically generated a bone 
age assessment in the background: radiologists made an independent tentative diagnosis then viewed a 
numerical bone age generated by the AI which was pre-populated into their radiology report.  
Although they expected AI to improve their speed and diagnostic outcomes, the Pediatrics radiologists’ 
actual use of the tool in fact impeded those outcomes. In the occurrences where the assessments converged 
(about a third of the time), the radiologist expressed happy surprise and signed the report: “I would give 
him 12. So what did the computer give him? It gave 12 years 2 months! So that’s close enough. I gave 12, 
and it gave 12 years 2 months. How it knew that? I have no idea,” (Nathan). However, in the vast majority 
of cases, the radiologists’ tentative diagnosis conflicted with the AI assessment6. Dealing with the conflicting 
information required radiologists to spend more time completing the previously routine task, as illustrated 
by the following case. Nadia’s eyes flicked back and forth between the standard images and the patient’s x-
                                                        
5 Urbanside Pediatrics radiologists typically conducted less than five bone age assessments per day. 
Referring clinicians ordered a bone age study to determine the extent to which a patient could tolerate 
growth hormones. For instance, it would be ill-advised to use such treatment for patients’ whose skeletal 
bone age is more advanced than their chronological age.  
6 It is difficult to say for certain whether the radiologist or the AI tool is “more accurate”. However, it is 
common practice for the radiologist’s (or a consensus of radiologists’) opinion to be considered the gold 
standard.  
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ray as she formed her independent diagnosis: “I’m looking at how wide is this area here (the areas 
separating the bones of the fingers). Looking at the different shapes. This is bigger. This is same. I think 
he’s between 8 and 9. The machine says between 9 and 10. Closer to 10 actually!” Responding to the AI’s 
assessment, Nadia cocked her head to the side in frustration at the discrepancy: “Now I’m going to try to 
find why it said that.” She consulted the text book again, flipping to the 10 year standard, and shook her 
head, “but I feel he’s not that close to that (10 years). I think the machine’s overestimating. To me, it’s 8 and 
9. Sometimes I change my mind after hearing what the machine says. But this time, no. No.” 
In cases of divergence, ambiguity surged due to the conflicting information. This was the case for Nadia, 
who struggled in the face of the AI-induced ambiguity: “Sometimes it (the AI) would give me bone ages that 
would make me re-think what I said and go, ‘Ok, maybe.’ And I would adjust closer to it (the AI assessment). 
But sometimes, I think, ‘This is way off.’ So I don’t know. I just don’t know,” (Nadia). In the face of the 
ambiguity of conflicting assessments, radiologists began doubting the diagnosis and had to answer the 
question of what was the most accurate diagnosis?  
Radiologists coped with increased ambiguity by questioning the AI’s validity as well as questioning their 
own diagnosis. Regarding their doubt about the AI’s validity, the professionals raised questions about the 
tool’s development, diagnosis process, and quality relative to their own. They questioned how the tool was 
trained, what data was included, and who were the radiologists who provided the training assessments: “If 
I knew it was all done by Pediatric radiologists who had read thousands and thousands of bone ages, I think 
I would consider it probably more vetted, more trust-worthy,” (Lori). They also asked questions about how 
the tool’s diagnostic process related to the way they were professional trained to make such diagnoses: “I 
feel sometimes the algorithm is looking at different things than I am…We are trained to use the phalanges 
as the gold standard, but there’s also carpal bones and the radius ulna…We don’t look at those as much. I 
don’t know how much weight the AI gives to that,” (Rita). Finally, questioned were raised as to whether the 
AI could provide high quality assessments than their won: “I wanted to see how well the computer could 
do. Because I believe I’m an expert, so I wanted to see how good this computer is,” (Nathan). 
At the same time, radiologists were also questioning their own diagnosis. Upon viewing conflicting AI 
assessments, the ambiguity led them to second-guess their own expertise for this task: “I’m often 
disagreeing with the model, and maybe it’s just me and I don’t know how to read bone ages,” (Nadia). To 
resolve discordant assessments, radiologists re-evaluated the standard image at the bone age suggested by 
the AI tool. They reasoned about what logic the AI may be drawing upon and whether it differed from their 
own professional approach. In the following instance, Nathan began his evaluation at the 18 year old 
standard in the text book, which was the patient’s chronological age: “You see here (on the patient’s x-ray), 
all fissured. See here in the book, there’s still a tiny physis here, you can still see a light line here.” A bright 
white line (the “tiny physis”) ran horizontally between the dark grey bones in the 18-year-old standard 
image in the text book; no such horizontal white line was visible on the patient’s x-ray (which Nathan 
described as “all fissured”). This suggested to Nathan that the patient’s bone age is more advanced than 18 
years, since the bones had grown even closer together than the 18-year old standard. Upon reading the AI 
assessment of 17 years 4 months, Nathan sighed heavily and returned to the text book: “Look here (pointing 
to the 18- year-old standard), it’s open. And here (pointing to the patient’s x-ray), it’s not open at all. So I’m 
going to give it 19. Either way, it is still read as normal. But still, I disagree with the computer on this one.”  
Ultimately the use of the bone age assessment AI tool induced additional ambiguity which Urbanside 
radiologists struggled to reduce using doubting and questioning practices. The following section examines 
two other AI tools used by radiologists in the Chest and Breast sections. 
Using AI for routine lung and breast cancer screening tasks 
A common task in the Breast and Chest sections is performing routine cancer screenings. This task is highly 
subject to making errors due to the possibility of radiologists missing consequential details in the complex 
studies. To screen a patient for cancer, radiologists carefully scrutinized either series of images in CT studies 
(when screening for lung cancer) or highly-magnified mammogram images (when screening for breast 
cancer). They searched for tiny abnormalities throughout the images that could be the beginning stages of 
life-threatening diseases. In the following case, June (Chest) described the difficulty of searching for lung 
nodules, as she scrolled vigorously through the full length of the CT series of images for several minutes: 
“In this view, the lungs are squished together and there are some hidden areas...I can’t do both lungs at the 
same time. I go through this section, then this section there, then that area. I don’t see anything major 
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jumping out. Hopefully I’m not missing anything.” Radiologists described the unwavering attention and 
special expertise required for cancer screening tasks to avoid missing a potentially life-threatening finding: 
“There's different things were looking for in the mammogram (image): masses, calcifications, skin 
thickening, changes to the tissue, axillary lymph nodes, distortion. All these different things to see if there's 
disease or not,” (Kyle, Breast). 
Urbanside radiologists in the Breast and Chest sections have been using AI tools during cancer screening 
tasks for several years. Radiologists refer to these tools as “CAD” tools (computer-aided detection tools). 
CAD tools were provided by external vendors and each one was developed, trained, and validated uniquely 
for the anatomical area and distinct nature of the task (e.g., searching for nodules in lung tissue vs searching 
for masses and tissue distortion in breast tissue). Therefore, the technical structure of the underlying CAD 
tools differed. However both tools signaled potential abnormalities to the radiologists by presenting a series 
of circles, triangles, and stars as an overlay on the patient’s image: “This star is saying that there’s a density 
here and this triangle says there are calcifications that are suspicious here,” (Sophie, Breast). 
When radiologists viewed the results presented by the CAD tools, they experienced increased ambiguity. 
They typically did not use CAD to guide their initial decision making but instead evoked the tool (and its 
associated ambiguity) as the last step in their diagnostic process. Using in this manner provided a way to 
exercise doubt against their own tentative assessment, as June (Chest) explained, “I only turn on the CAD 
at the very end. If I had it on early, as I’m scrolling through, my eyes just pop straight to what they marked. 
So I like to look through all of it on my own first and see everything I can then turn it on afterwards.” Due 
to their focus on making complete and accurate diagnosis decisions, radiologists regarded CAD as a version 
of a second opinion or double-read for the high stakes cancer screening tasks: “A little assist is not the worst 
idea...If we’re not going to double-read mammos (using two radiology professionals) then something like 
an AI double-read can be helpful,” (Lola, Breast).  
In contrast to Pediatrics radiologists who questioned both themselves and the tool, Chest and Breast 
radiologists coped with AI-induced ambiguity by only mildly questioning themselves. Using CAD led 
radiologists to briefly pause and reconsider their assessment, but rarely did it result in meaningful 
diagnostic changes. Radiologists responded in this manner when dealing with ambiguity stemming from 
two paths of conflicting information. In the first path, CAD flagged areas the radiologist did not initially 
detect or find concerning: “You go look for nodules to mark them, and you use the CAD and find any nodules 
that you missed,” (Brady, Chest). In these cases, radiologists mildly questioned themselves by quickly 
assessing each flagged area. However, they rarely altered their decision because they concluded the 
markings were false positives: “We discount a lot of the stuff it picks up because it's just picking up 
nothingness,” (Kyle, Breast). In the second path, ambiguity emerged when radiologists flagged areas of 
concern that CAD did not detect, such as in the following case: “CAD didn’t mark anything on this one. It 
didn’t even mark the thing that caught the radiologists’ attention!” (Lola, Breast). In these cases, 
radiologists did not waver in their determination that the area was concerning, and they concluded the non-
marked areas were false negatives: “They (CAD markings) are not the primary determinant…If there’s 
something that’s concerning to you, based on your initial interpretation, that the CAD is saying, ‘Oh, this 
looks normal,’ that’s not something you would use. You wouldn’t use that information and say, ‘Oh, we’re 
not going to biopsy it,’” (Sophie, Breast).  
For radiologists in these sections, there was no questioning of CAD’s validity or of the tools’ diagnostic 
processes. Years of concluding that CAD’s markings were frequently false positives or false negatives had 
crystalized radiologists’ perceptions of the shortcomings of the tools. This was particularly the case for the 
CAD tool used in Breast imaging: “CAD sucks. That’s why nobody likes it.” (Lola, Breast). CAD often flagged 
findings that were obvious to expertly trained Breast radiologists, but did not typically suggest additional 
findings that the radiologist missed: “CAD increases sensitivity but not specificity….If you follow-up on 
everything it said, your specificity would be down in the basement. Sensitivity is over the top, and specificity 
is way under,” (Hattie, Breast). As Hattie explained, in addition to CAD reporting too many false positives 
(“sensitivity is over the top”), it failed to strengthen radiologists’ weaknesses and provided too many false 
negatives (“specificity is way under”). These views were stabilized over years of interacting with CAD, so we 
did not observe radiologists engage in question these AI tools in practice.  
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3.0 Shifting routine decision making tasks to nonroutine  
Even for highly routine and by-the-books tasks like bone age assessment and routine cancer screening, 
Urbanside radiologists use of AI tools in these settings varied widely. In all three sections, the use of AI tools 
induced additional ambiguity that required radiologists to take action to resolve. Depending on the user 
and their context, there were varying degrees of questioning and scrutinizing. This was exacerbated by the 
ongoing tension between the perceived usefulness of using AI tools and the perceived costs of doing so, 
which resulted in further variation in how and when different radiologists used the tools in practice. Finally, 
ongoing use of the bone age AI tool ultimately led to variation in how Pediatrics radiologists read bone age 
studies, as some individuals changed their practices to mimic the AI tool. This variation is described in the 
remainder of this section.  
Trading offs perceived costs and usefulness of AI 
Across all three sections, Urbanside radiologists’ own professional judgement consistently outweighed the 
AI assessment. The previous section revealed how Chest and Breast radiologists frequently overruled CAD 
by disregarding its common false positives and negatives. In the case of the bone age task, Pediatrics 
radiologists corrected the AI assessment in over 68% of the cases7, suggesting their perception that the tool 
was inferior to their professional ability. This practice was surprising given that Urbanside radiologists 
commonly expressed how low they held the bar of expertise required to make routine and by-the-book bone 
age assessments: “Quite frankly, I think anyone can do a bone age…It’s pattern recognition. Right. I don’t 
think it’s a very sophisticated thing,” (Lori). Such perspectives were widely shared in the section: “Do you 
have a high school education? You can read a bone age,” (Miguel), and, “There’s nothing scientific about 
this. It’s just, ya know, kind of comparison.” (Rita).  
However, just as Urbanside radiologists did not robotically accept the tools’ assessments, they also did not 
automatically record their own assessment. There were occasions when the tools provided critical insights: 
“I always check CAD, but I take it with a grain of salt basically because it picks up things that are normal, 
that are totally negative. But once in a while it definitely picks up things that you looked at yourself and you 
totally ignored, that you just couldn’t see,” (Shirma, Chest). At the same time, constant supervision was 
required to use the tool effectively: “CAD is often wrong…You do have to quality check it (CAD) a lot,” 
(Brady, Chest) and, “I still have to just double-check it, and then make sure, and then change it,” (Miguel, 
Pediatrics). Thus, Urbanside radiologists worked to vigilantly monitor the tools in order to avoid becoming 
complacent, as explained by Nathan (Pediatrics): “If people become complacent and they feel like, ‘Oh, this 
thing (AI) is great! This can do everything!’ Then I think it can have a real downside.”  
Consequently, the time radiologists spent deliberating cases while using AI actually increased. Radiologists 
engaged in questioning the AI and more thoroughly securitized their own diagnosis. These practices 
required valuable time that radiologists generally did not have, as Lola (Breast) expressed, “A lot of the stuff 
CAD draws attention to, you wish it didn’t.” Time was spent coping with ambiguity and reconciling 
conflicting information: “It slows me down. Because I see what it says, and I don’t trust it,” (Nadia, 
Pediatrics) and, “It's actually just another step for me to do. Like, how many times did I click that thing on 
and off just to evaluate what it's picking up?” (Kyle, Breast). At the same time, the additional time was 
rationalized by some radiologists in favor of helping improve their diagnostic outcomes: “You’re willing to 
sacrifice the fact that you might pick up false stuff because you really are trying to catch the things that are 
most concerning,” (Raj, Breast).  
Tradeoffs between the perceived usefulness of using AI and its perceived costs resulted in variation in how 
and when these tools were used. In the case of the CAD tools, senior radiologists expressed more critical 
attitudes towards CAD based on their years of experience overruling CAD’s false positives and negatives: “I 
mean, the cancers? I know what it looks like, ya know? I don’t need you (CAD) to tell me what cancer looks 
like. Clearly benign things? Also, I don’t need you,” (a senior Breast radiologist). Therefore, some senior 
radiologists used CAD less consistently and with less attentiveness: “I sometimes hit it (CAD) at the end. 
But like, when I’m in a rush, I don’t always hit it. It’s probably not appropriate, but it’s just reality,” (a senior 
Breast radiologist). In contrast, radiologists in training at Urbanside (fellows and residents) had 
                                                        
7 Adjustments made to the assessment varied from one month to two and a half years. 
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accumulated less first-hand exposure to the specific benefits and limitations of CAD. They also tended to 
compensate their less-developed professional expertise by consulting CAD more consistently and earnestly: 
“For me, I kind of suck at finding lung nodules just by scrolling through like this. So I know this (CAD) is 
going to help them stand out a little better,” (Cal, Chest Fellow). Consequently, these more junior 
individuals were particularly appreciative of the stronger peace of mind they experienced after consulting 
the tool: “You want to have confidence in your decision. It's nice to have help…especially on those question 
mark cases,” (Kyle, Breast Fellow).  
Changing standardized practices to mimic AI 
In the case of the bone age task, there was increased deviation in how Pediatrics radiologists performed this 
previously routine task. This deviation is related to the introduction and ongoing use of the bone age AI 
tool. Prior to the implementation of the tool, Pediatrics radiologists at Urbanside followed a standard 
practice when evaluating bone ages: use the whole-numbers associated with the standards included in the 
professionally-instituted Greulich and Pyle8 atlas (e.g., reporting a bone age of “6 years” or “between 14 and 
15 years”). Miguel described his adherence to this standard practice even when the patient’s x-ray appeared 
somewhere between the standard years: “Normally, in the past, if I thought the bone age was something in 
between…I would say in my report – and this is just because somebody taught me this – I would say, ‘The 
bone age is in between 12 and 13 years.’”  
However, in the reports generated by the bone age AI tool, a more granular bone age was used which 
included a numerical value for the years and the months (e.g. reporting a bone age of “5 years 2 months”). 
This approach was in direct conflict to radiologists’ typical training, as explained by Rita, “This AI program 
kind of interpolates what it thinks it’s closest to. It doesn’t always give you the exact number. It gives you a 
kind of interpolation between standards. So we don’t typically do that.”  
Accordingly, some radiologists balked at the AI’s divergence from their standard approach. When Shira 
read bone ages, she remained aligned with the standard approach she was trained to use and pointed to her 
confusion of the tool’s approach: “It is confusing to me. It would give me a bone age of like, 10 years 1 month. 
My human brain does not know what 10 years and 1 month looks like. I know what 10 years looks like. I 
know what 11 years looks like…Even saying something is at a half way point between those two, we don’t 
know! That doesn’t make any sense to me.” Others agreed and continued to report using their professional 
standard, overruling any assessment whereby the tool reported a month-level granularity: “It will give you 
things like 11 years 8 months. Like how do you get that? I can’t break something up into – I would maybe 
be able to break it up into quarters, but not like twelfths.  So I don’t know what to do when it gives me like 
8 months. I’m like, ‘Uh-uh. No.’” (Nadia). 
Alternatively, some radiologists observed the AI reporting at a higher granularity and accepted this as a 
valid way to read bone age studies. This acceptance was granted despite the fact that it deviated from their 
previous standards, as explained by Nathan, “If they (the AI) gives a weird bone age, like 14 years 2 months, 
and I think it’s 14 years – that’s close enough to me! Given that the standard deviation is 28 months, I’m 
okay with reporting using the two months.” This acceptance was so strong that some radiologists changed 
their own practices and began independently reading bone ages in a way that mimicked the AI’s granularity. 
One afternoon in the Pediatrics reading room, Rita dictated her decision of the current bone age case: “13 
years and 4 months.” The author asked how did arrive at that decision, and she explained: “It’s a little bit 
less than the standard 13 years 6 months. (She paused and shrugged) Not everybody does that. I guess I’ve 
been doing that since the AI started doing it.”   
In each of the three sections, Urbanside radiologists performed previously routine decision making tasks 
with higher degrees of variation upon using AI tools. This was unexpected, given their expectations that AI 
would simply perform the tedious task and improve radiologists’ efficiency. Not only did it increase 
variation, but the use of AI tools induced additional ambiguity into the previously routine tasks. Thus, as 
radiologists worked to cope with the ambiguity, their efficiency actually diminished. 
                                                        
8 Greulich and Pyle's Radiographic Atlas of Skeletal Development of the Hand and Wrist. 1959. Stanford 
University Press. 
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Discussion 
This study provides one of the first studies of the use of AI for conducting professional decision making 
tasks. It illuminates the important link between ambiguity and the use of such tools in high judgement 
decision making activities. Weick (1990) conceptualized early decision support technologies as 
“equivoque”, or open to multiple interpretations and subject to uncertainty. As technologies become more 
advanced, he argued it would be essential for users to be able “to reason about the deep structure of new 
systems” (Weick, 1990: 39). Indeed, tools using AI methods are increasingly opaque and inscrutable, 
whereby layers of complex reasoning takes place out of sight and inaccessible to end-users (Faraj et al. 
2018). Even prior to the current breakthroughs in AI technology, scholars have been focusing on the extent 
to which knowledge work professionals have been able to understand and critically evaluate assumptions 
underlying technologies they encounter at work (Anthony 2018; Bailey and Barley 2010; Dodgson et al. 
2007; Knorr-Cetina 1999).  
This study illuminates how issues of opacity are particularly salient and consequential in decision making 
tasks that involve intelligent technologies like AI tools. Researchers have been examining how work 
practices are impacted when the assumptions embedded in technology were not immediately obvious to 
users (Bailey et al. 2012; Boland et al. 2007). For tasks involving professional decision making, the process 
of logical reasoning that an AI tool (or a human) used to reach a given conclusion is highly relevant. 
Particularly in healthcare contexts, where professionals bear legal, professional, and moral responsibility 
for their decision making, they were highly unsatisfied by the lack of information available to them about 
the tool. As prior literature predicts, these professionals engaged in limited degrees of questioning practices 
(Anthony 2018). However, the technical opacity and the intense time pressure precluded them from 
engaging in extensive search or prolonged questioning. Lacking information intensified the degree of 
ambiguity they faced and was critical to their ultimate integration (or lack of integration) of the tools’ 
assessments, as exemplified by this Pediatrics radiologist, “Knowing more about how the algorithm was 
trained and using what standard would certainly change my confidence. Because I would have some 
understanding of it. It might also decrease my confidence. So either further decrease it or increase it. It 
certainly would. Of course,” (Shira). Although they were unable to peer inside the technical composition of 
the AI tools, they made comparisons between the AI output and other available information to form their 
assessment of AI validity.   
Opacity is also critical to how AI tools are perceptions and use became stabilize over time, as ongoing, 
situated practices accumulated. One of the hallmark features of modern AI tools is their ability to 
continually learn and dynamically improve their accuracy (Faraj et al. 2018). However, we find that users’ 
perceptions crystallized early on, despite the fact that the quality of the tool could significantly improve over 
time. Since the tools operate behind the scenes, outside of the realm of users’ visibility, professionals were 
unable to interrogate the tool or have any sense of the tools’ changing quality. Ultimately this study expands 
our understanding of the relationship between intelligent tools’ characteristics related to opacity and the 
degree of ambiguity in decision making processes. This study shows that the resulting ambiguity led actors’ 
to generally overrule opaquely-generated outputs and rely on their own known professional judgement 
process, despite the underlying quality of the AI tool. 
Finally, this study reveals the unexpected dynamics and resulting ambiguity involved in implementing AI 
into high judgement work. As technical advances of AI continue to explode across industries and in 
healthcare in particular, the wave of “digital exceptionalism” is also rapidly growing (Lancet 2018). Digital 
exceptionalism describes the view of many futurists, technology optimists, advocates, developers, and 
vendors who evangelize the remarkable outcomes that can result from the widespread adoption and use of 
advanced innovations in intelligent technologies. However, there is an equally prominent set of voices 
advocating for caution and the need to gather grounded understandings of how such tools are poised to 
impact medical practices, professionals, and patient outcomes in the coming years and decades (Marabelli 
and Newell 2019; Recht and Bryan 2017). This study provided such in-depth examination. Doing so 
revealed the complexities of implementing and using AI tools in clinical settings, where, rather than 
alleviating uncertainty, AI introduced additional ambiguity into medical decision making. Moreover, the 
implementation of AI did not result in a tidy story of work automation or complete resistance, but instead, 
the use of such tools led to new configurations of professionals and AI working in partnership to make 
decisions with life or death consequences. 
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